What Drives the Market's Return on Equity?

Earning a high return on equity is one of the primary reasons to do business. Managers of (and investors in) companies want to earn the highest return on their equity as possible, and sustain this high rate of return over as long a period as possible. Some sectors of the market, like consumer staples, have had remarkably high returns over the very long-term, while others, like automobiles, have had extremely cyclically returns on equity.

The market as a whole is cyclical too, sitting somewhere between these two extremes over the past fifty years. In this piece I’ll break the market-level return on equity into its components (profit margin, asset turnover, and financial leverage) and try to identify where we are in the current cycle.

Three Components

High return on equity is almost always a good thing, but the source of return can come from three different areas.

1.       Profit Margin—calculated as net income (earnings) divided by sales (revenue), this simple measure shows how much of a company’s (or the market’s) sales are converted to bottom line earnings after all ordinary or extraordinary expenses. Higher margin = higher return on equity.

2.       Asset Turnover—calculated as sales divided by average assets, this measure shows how “productive” assets are. Imagine two companies that both use similar machines (which each cost $10,000) to make widgets. Company A uses its machine to produce $10,000 in widget sales per year while company B uses its machine to produce $20,000 in sales. Company A has an asset turnover of 1.0 while company B has an asset turnover of 2.0. Company B is using its assets more effectively. Higher asset turnover = higher return on equity.

3.       Financial Leverage—calculated as average total assets divided by total common (owner’s) equity, this measures how much the company has borrowed to earn its way. Leverage is always a tricky beast. Some leverage often makes sense and is an easy way to boost returns and profits; but too much leverage can spell doom. Higher financial leverage = higher return on equity.

With these three components, we can calculate return on equity as:

Profit margin * asset turnover * financial leverage = ROE

So where do we stand on these three measures? The figure below shows the rolling history of each—alongside the market’s total return on equity[i]

Several interesting trends emerge. While the market’s ROE itself has been very cyclical and mean reverting, the components have had more secular trends. Asset turnover has been in steady decline for several decades, falling from 1.23x in 1981 to 0.81x today. Financial leverage has also had a fairly steady decline from its all-time high of 3.4x in 1994 to 2.7x today. In fact, if you just multiply asset turnover times financial leverage, the resulting trend line looks very different from ROE.

Margins

That means that profit margins are the driving force (mathematically anyway) behind the market ROE’s cyclicality. Net profit margins can, in turn, be broken down into components just like ROE, and again there are three key variables:

1.       Operating Margin—operating profits (earnings before interest and taxes) divided by sales

2.       Interest Factor[ii]—Earnings after interest divided by operating earnings

3.       Tax Factor[iii]— Net income divided by Pretax income (earnings after interest) 

Just like with ROE, net margin is calculated as:

Operating margin * interest burden * tax burden = net margin

Here is the history of each component:

The two most recent spikes down in margin (and therefore in market-wide ROE) are due in large part to spikes down in the tax and interest factors. Think about interest, for example. During these two rough markets in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009, earnings fell off a cliff but fixed payments on interest remain fairly steady, so a much higher percentage of earnings are going towards interest payments.

Here is the combined effect of taxes and interest over time.

What’s Next?

I am no good at predicting anything, but it’s clear that each of these components can have a large influence on the return the overall market’s ROE. While the combination of asset turnover and financial leverage appear to be in the midst of a secular decline, margins are near all-time highs. Can margins stay here much longer? Operating margins have moved off of their recent all-time high, while the combination of taxes and interest is reducing operating profits by less than is typical throughout history (meaning that the combination of low effective tax rates and cheap debt are allowing companies to “keep” more of their operating profits).  

Interest rates will rise at some point (right?) and operating margins have been fairly cyclical in the past. My guess is that, like most things in the market, things will be cyclical and ROEs will decline. Hopefully this causes everyone to freak out so that we can buy stocks at cheaper multiples than we can today.

NOTE: I’d love to hear your thoughts on this piece. I am swimming in new macro/top-down waters here, because my investment philosophy/process is purely bottom up and ROE is not an important component in stock selection.  I mainly write to learn, so these posts are me reporting data and learning on the fly, so I may be getting aspects wrong. Email me Patrick.w.oshaughnessy@gmail.com with any thoughts.

Calculation Note: Prior to 1976 I have to use annual data (as opposed to quarterly) due to availability issues.


[i] This entire analysis excludes financial stocks, where return on assets are often a better measure of returns. If people are interested I may do another post specifically on financials because they are such a large part of the market.

[ii] Normally these are called interest “burden” and tax “burden,” but I hate that name because a higher “burden” sounds bad but you want these numbers to be higher (because a higher number keeps the total margin higher).

[iii] Other items sit between Pretax income and net income and would be bundled in this calculation: noncontrolling interest income, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations

The Market's Return on Equity

“Jesse Livermore” has a thorough and convincing new article in which he argues that return on equity (ROE) matters more than profit margins, because it is high ROEs—not high profit margins—that lure new entrants into a market and drive competition.  As Livermore says,

Corporations seek to maximize their total profits…The mistake we’re making here is to assume that corporations “compete” for profit margins. They don’t. Profit margins have no value at all. What has value is a return. The decision to expand into the market of a competitor and seek additional return is not a decision driven by the expected profit margin, the expected return relative to the anticipated quantity of sales. Rather, it’s a decision driven instead by the expected ROE, the expected return relative to the amount of capital that will have to be invested, put at risk, in order to earn it.
— "Jesse Livermore"

Indeed, market ROE has exhibited strong mean reversion over the past 50 years. What follows is a breakdown of contribution by sector to the overall market’s ROE. We are above the long term average, but current levels look completely normal relative to past ROE “peaks.”

I wrote an article about the changing composition of market profit margins, and the story for ROE is very similar. 50 years ago, technology and health care stocks represented a small percentage of the market’s ROE.  In 1964, the two sectors represented just 5% of the markets total common equity (book value). But today, these two sectors combine to represent nearly 32% of the non-financial market’s common equity value.

ROE mean reversion is much more pronounced in some sectors than in others. Here are a few examples.

Current ROE levels are high but well within reason based on historical averages and market cycle peaks. This paints a much different valuation picture than the popular profit margin chart (corporate profits/GDP) that bears are fond of citing (seen at left below). ROE reversion will no doubt continue in future market cycles as it has in the past—nothing appears to be that different this time.

Some calculation notes: ROE by market and sector is a simple comparison of total annual net income to total common equity. The universe is all U.S. domiciled stocks with an inflation adjusted market cap larger than $200MM since 1964. I exclude financials and any securities for which I am missing either net income or common equity data. I also exclude companies with negative common equity. 

Top Margin Companies

The market’s overall profit margin is the result of profit margins within individual sectors, but within sectors it is typically a small group of companies that dominate. Here are some interesting trends related to those companies.

Technology

The technology sector has grown to be a large contributor to the markets overall margin, representing 23.3% of the markets overall margin in 2014 (up from 2.7% in the early 1960s).

Just as the market’s margin is dominated by tech stocks, the tech sector margin is dominated by a small group of stocks at the top. Indeed outside the top 8 stocks, all of which have impressively high margins, the remained 400 or so stocks in the technology sector have a margin that looks much more like the overall market.

Apple, Google, IBM, and Microsoft are the key companies here.  If you think their margins are sustainable, then the market’s overall margin may remain higher.  Here are their margins in the past 10 years. Capital should rotate into high margin industries and bring down these margins over time, but they haven’t budged much in 10 years.

Concentration at the top

Just like in the tech sector, margins for the overall market are all about the stocks at the top of the heap. The top 20 contributors to the market’s overall margin account for an average 40% of the markets margin over the past 50 years, meaning the fate of these top companies and their margins will have a large impact on the future of market profit margins.  Here are the top 20 contributors today.  Many of these companies have extremely strong brands and/or moats, meaning their profit margin edge may be hard to disrupt in the near term. I think margins will contract, because arguing against mean reversion is a dangerous game.  But given the persistent margins enjoyed by so many companies at the top, I doubt we will soon revisit the margin lows seen in the past.

 

NOTE: Financials excluded in this post

Profit Margins – Behind the Curtain

Profit margins are an important component of market valuation and are therefore a hot topic because the damn things won't do what they are supposed to and mean revert.  As several writers have explained, the valuation arguments for U.S. stocks (bull and bear) hinge on the future of profit margins (my favorite pieces are by James Montier here and by “Jesse Livermore” here).  Bears say that margins are long overdue for a serious mean reversion, and that such a reversion would result in very low real rates of return over the next 5-10 years.

But everything I’ve read addresses margins at the market level, when we should be diving deeper to the sector level.  Comparing margins today to margins 50 years ago may be misleading, because the mix of businesses contributing to the market’s overall margin has changed considerably. There are very interesting trends within the 9 economic sectors (not including financials here), and their contribution to overall market margins have changed a lot over time. In particular, the contribution from the technology sector (with sustained high margins) to overall margins has grown steadily while contribution from the Materials sector (whose margins exhibit strong mean reversion) has fallen.  Here is the historical profit margin for all U.S. stocks (line in black) and the contribution to that overall margin from each economic sector. Notice the expansion of Info Tech and the shrinking of Materials.

It could be that businesses that are less labor intensive—like technology companies—produce sustainably higher profit margins. As their overall market share and earnings share (sales and earnings as a percent of total, previously discussed here) continue to rise, profit margins might stay higher than they have been in the past. 

Information Technology stocks contributed just 3% of the overall profit margin in 1963 (6.42% profit margin * 2.7% sales market share for the sector / total market profit margin), but tech stocks contribute nearly a quarter (23.3%) of today’s total profit margin.  

Apple is obviously a huge part of this trend.  Even with all its retail stores, Apple only has 84,000 employees.  That means Apple generates about $2M in sales per employee and nearly $500k of profit per employee.  Whole Foods has a similar amount of employees (78,000) but generates $164k in sales per employee and $7k in profit per employee.  Target—a very labor intensive business—has 360,000 employees, generates $200k in revenue/employee, and generates just $7k in profit/employee.  In addition to offering lower margin products, companies like Target have to deal with a much higher payroll tax burden than companies like Apple.

As Martin Ford says in his book The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future:

We can place any industry somewhere on the spectrum that runs from being extremely labor intensive to being highly capital intensive. In our current economy, some of the most labor intensive industries are in the retail, hospitality and small business sectors. Supermarkets, retail chain stores, restaurants and hotels all have to hire lots of workers. Capital intensive industries, on the other hand, hire relatively few workers and instead require investment in technology: in advanced machinery and equipment and in computerized systems. High tech industries such as semiconductor manufacturing, biotechnology and Internet-based companies are all capital intensive. Over time, as technology advances, most industries become more capital intensive and less labor intensive. Technology also creates entirely new industries, and these are nearly always capital intensive.

Might this evolution of business mean that profit margins will stay higher than the historical average? The James Montier paper referenced earlier gives the most compelling case that margins will mean revert, but perhaps margins will fall less than bears are expecting them to.  Except for the massive reversal during the internet/tech bubble, Technology margins have been much higher than the market and they’ve been gaining market and earnings share steadily.

Tech stocks' market share moved from 2.6% in 1963 to 12.1% in 2014, and their earnings share moved from 2.7% to 23.1% over the same period.  The tech sector has grown to be a larger part of the economy, and a larger part of the market's profit margins.  It is therefore also a larger part of the market's valuation. High margins in the tech space may persist or they may not. Either way, arguments about the overall market’s margin--and its prospects for the future--should center around the businesses that contribute to that margin, not just about margin levels in the past.

Here are a few other interested trends. Consumer staples have not exhibited the same mean reversion in profit margin that we see for the market as a whole but consumer discretionary stocks are wildly cyclical (as expected).

Resource stocks—materials specifically—appear to have the most consistent margin mean reversion.

Note: for this post I used Compustat data throughout. I include all U.S. domiciled stocks with an inflation adjusted market cap greater that $200M, so it is a larger universe than the S&P 500 alone. Margins are just the sum of net income (at the sector or market level) divided by the sum of sales.