How Concentrated Should You Make Your Value Portfolio?

To take advantage of value investing, you need a smaller portfolio than you may think. I was curious to see what different levels of portfolio concentration would have produced in a value-only portfolio over the past 50 years, and report the results here.  

I set up portfolios which bought the absolute cheapest stocks trading in the U.S. (including ADRs). Portfolios ranged from 1 stock to 100 stocks, and stocks needed to have a minimum market cap of $200MM (inflation adjusted). Cheapness is defined as an equal weighted combination of a stock’s price/earnings, price/sales, EBITDA/EV, Free Cash Flow/EV and total (shareholder) yield. Each portfolio was rebalanced on a rolling annual basis (meaning 1/12 of the portfolio is rebalanced every month.  Think of it like maintaining 12 separate, annually rebalanced portfolios). This means that the “one stock portfolio” will have more than one stock, because different stocks rise to the top through the months. This process removes any seasonal biases and makes the test more robust.

Here are the results, including return and Sharpe ratio. The best returns came from a 5 stock (!) portfolio. The best Sharpe ratio came from the 15 stock version. Both return and Sharpe degrade after 15 stocks.

The same is true of glamour portfolios. The concentrated glamour portfolios have bad returns and are incredibly volatile.  The 1-stock version had an annual standard deviation of 50% and the 5 stock version had a standard deviation of 40% (hint, I wouldn’t short these!).

I’ve written before about overdiversification. I’m also a huge believe in high active share, and that to beat the market you must dare to be great (that is, different). These results are further evidence support these beliefs. 

Tech stocks CAN be great

Value investing has been the most consistent way to outperform the market for decades. It continues to work because it forces you to buy stocks for which the market has very low expectations (expectations which often turn out to be overly pessimistic). People are overly sensitive to losses and often shun value stocks. But what about using value in a sector that has traditionally been the most expensive out there? As we shall see, it is possible to find diamonds in the rough.

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One of the interesting byproducts of value investing has been a chronic underweight to the most fun sector: information technology. Let’s say every year all you did was buy the cheapest 10% of the market based on measures of value like price-to-sales, price-to-earnings, and EBITDA-to-enterprise value. The chart below shows—through time—what sectors you would have owned in this simple value strategy. Notice the slim band for IT stocks (in highlighter yellow). It is no coincidence that the sector has been the worst performing through time: technology companies—especially new ones—are often exciting, but you have to pay a dear price for stocks with vivid and potentially game-changing futures.

Consider technology stocks by one common value metric: price-to-cash flow. Below is the historical ratio for technology stocks versus the rest of the market (all non-tech, non-financial stocks).

What had been a massive overvaluation relative to the market has been steadily shrinking since the peak of the NASDAQ bubble in 2000. This lines up with the widening of the yellow band in Figure 1.

One great feature of value investing is that it doesn’t hold grudges. Who cares if tech has been expensive and a weak performer for decades? If those stocks are now trading at much cheaper multiples, we should consider them for the portfolio. I’ve written about Apple’s transformation from growth darling to hated value stock back to value darling. Apple’s journey typifies the sector as a whole.

Buying the best technology stocks

While more and more technology stocks look cheap, you can also use value to select the best investments within the technology sector. In fact, over the long term, the cheapest technology stocks have done quite well even as the most expensive tech stocks have lost money.

Here is the universe of technology stocks broken into quintiles (and best & worst 25 stock portfolios), and their historical returns and standard deviation of returns. These results are based on a rolling, annual rebalance like my other tests. Cheap technology stocks have delivered an annual return of nearly 14.5%, and have done so with much lower volatility than the rest of the sector.

We know that value works across sectors, but these results highlight the importance of valuations within sectors as well. If you want to buy tech stocks, forego the new exciting ones and focus instead on the cheap, seasoned alternatives.

Value and More

Value only works if you stick with it and adapt to changing opportunities. There are other factors—like momentum, quality, and shareholder orientation—that have provided an edge just as value has through time. I combine several of those key ideas into a cohesive whole in my upcoming book, Millennial Money: How Young Investors Can Build a Fortune. For information on the extra content available to those who pre-order the book, you can read more here

Searching for Deep Value Stocks

Deep value investing is a powerful way to beat the market, but deep value stocks are an endangered species in the U.S.

I was recently talking with Tobias Carlisle, author of Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations, about what constitutes a deep value stock. To find these stocks, Tobias prefers to use the “takeover” multiple. One version of the takeover multiple is the ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) to enterprise value (market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash).

This is a great multiple for stock selection. Like the price-to-earnings ratio, it helps you find unloved companies, but it also penalizes stocks for having too much debt (more debt = worse ratio, ceteris paribus). If all you did was buy the 10% of stocks with the cheapest EBITDA/EV ratios on an annual basis, you’d have outperformed the market by more than 5% annually over the past five decades.

I asked Tobias what he considers a very cheap multiple EV/EBITDA multiple, and we agreed that somewhere below 5x indicates a cheap stock, while a multiple of less than 3x indicates very deep value. So here is the problem: today, we face what is perhaps the most difficult environment for deep value investing in history.  Just 3.2% of non-financial, U.S. companies with a market cap of at least $200MM trade at an EV/EBITDA multiple below 5x.  That is just off June’s all-time low of 2.9%.

There are just 65 stocks today with deep value multiples. Most are small. While a few big energy stocks make the cut (COP, HES, MRO), the median market cap of these 65 stocks is just $1B. If we limit ourselves to EV/EBITDA multiples below 3x, then I see just 7 stocks available. The largest has a market cap less than $2B.

So what is a deep value investor to do? Two options are to go smaller (into the micro-cap market) and go international. I’ll explore these options in a future post. Going smaller isn’t feasible for big institutional asset managers, but is possible for the little guy. Going international is great, but hard to execute as a small individual investor.

As I’ve written before, this bull market has left us with a very homogenous market where valuations are clustered around the mean. The sad fact is that in 2014, it’s hard out there for a deep value investor.

For much more on the topic, go read Tobias’s book. You’ll notice that the book is expensive, but trust me—it is worth every penny. 

 

 

Good Businesses at Good Prices

There isn’t a more commonly recited investment strategy than “buy good businesses at good prices.” This simple strategy sums up much of Warren Buffett’s success, and countless investors have attempted to mimic his style. Indeed, when I asked those on twitter what their favorite investing ‘factor’ was, the most common response was price-to-book (P/B) divided by return on equity (ROE).  The idea behind the simple ratio is to find good businesses (high ROE) at good prices (low P/B). This factor is similar to another similar two-factor comparison, Joel Greenblatt’s “magic formula,” which also combines a measure of good businesses (high return on invested capital) and good prices (cheap earnings-before-interest-and-taxes to enterprise value).

I rebuilt the factor since 1963, ranking all stocks by P/B-to-ROE and sorting them into deciles[i].  Since each decile represents several hundred stocks (and is therefore unrealistic for individual investors to manage) I’ve also included a concentrated, 25 stock strategy which selects the best stocks in the market by this measure. So does this simple measure help you find stocks that will outperform the market? The answer is a qualified yes. The top 20% of the market by the P/B-to-ROE measure does tend to outperform by a decent margin…but the concentrated portfolio isn’t as impressive.

Results

Here are the results for the 10 deciles—and the 25-stock strategy—versus the market. Both of the top two deciles outperform the market, but the second decile provides the highest Sharpe ratio.

More curious is that the concentrated version doesn’t do all that well. While it does beat the market over the very long term, it is not at all consistent. In rolling 10-year periods, it only beats the all stock universe 26% of the time—before costs. If transaction costs and taxes were factored in, it wouldn't be worth it.  As for the top decile, you'd have to be very patient to win with this strategy. There has been a 1-in-5 chance, historically, that the best decile underperforms the market in a 5-year period--and again, that is before costs. 

I should note that price-to-book is the least impressive value factor I’ve tested, and ROE is the least impressive measure of quality/profitability. EBITDA/EV, for example, yields much better results than P/B, and ROIC yields much better results than ROE. Is this just historical coincidence, a small bit of data mining? It is impossible to say, but there are compelling reasons for using factors other than P/B and ROE—but that’s a topic for another post.

Let me know if you have other ideas for testing, email me at Patrick.w.oshaughnessy@gmail.com

 

[i] Deciles are rebalanced on a rolling annual basis, and companies with negative earning and/or negative equity are excluded.

Two Ways To Improve The Momentum Strategy

Momentum investing worked very well in 2013, but it’s been awful in 2014. The momentum reversal has been one of the major headlines in an otherwise flat and quiet market year because the high-flying stocks from 2013, especially popular tech names like Tesla, have been crushed in recent months. Momentum investing works great over the long term but can suffer from short term reversals that are painful to live through.  Luckily, there are ways to significantly improve the momentum trading strategy—which would have side-stepped the momentum carnage of 2014 completely.

Momentum Works On Its Own

Momentum investing is popular because it has worked well across market history. I’ll define momentum in simple terms: total return over the past 6 months. Since 1963, a strategy that buys the top group (best 10% of the market) of stocks by 6-month total return, has delivered a 14.4% annual return, which is roughly 4.5% better than the S&P 500. But, to earn this excess return you have to live through a roller coaster ride. The annualized volatility of this strategy is 24.4%—almost 10% more than the market’s 15% annual volatility.

The weakness of a raw momentum strategy is that it will sometimes piles you into very expensive and/or low quality stocks. At the end of 2013, companies in the top 10% of the market by trailing 6 month return (which included lots of social media stocks, biotechs, and power companies) had valuations which were, on average, more expensive than 67% of the market[i]. Some of the most talked about names like Plug Power and Twitter were literally the most expensive stocks in the market. The best way to mitigate this issue is by insisting on valuation and quality—if you never buy the expensive, junk stocks, then the momentum strategy gets much better.

Improving the Momentum Strategy with Value

You may think that value and momentum are polar opposites, but they work remarkably well together. Think of the combination as cheap stocks that the market is just beginning to notice.  The combination of the two factors yields results more impressive than either of the two investing styles on their own. (Note: for value, I’ll use the simplest measure possible to make the point: price/earnings)

The cheapest 10% of stocks by P/E have historically delivered 16.3% per year, and the top momentum stocks have delivered 14.4%, but a combination of the two has yielded 18.5% per year (bottom right corner of the table below). What’s more, the volatility of this combined strategy comes way down: from 24.4% for raw momentum to 18.9% for value + momentum.

The table below breaks all stocks into a 5x5 panel by value and momentum (6m return and price/earnings). Stocks in the upper left have terrible value and terrible momentum. Stocks in the lower right have great momentum and great valuations. The combination of these concepts has been very powerful.

Annualized returns, 1963-2013

Annualized returns, 1963-2013

Quality Works Too

A second way to improve the momentum strategy is to focus on companies with higher quality earnings. The simplest way to define quality earnings is by looking at non-cash earnings. The fewer non-cash earnings (which come from accruals like accounts receivable), the better[ii].  Here is a similar 5x5 panel by quality and momentum. The effect is similar to value, but quality is a different factor and so a different take on qualifying the stocks you are willing to buy.

Annualized returns, 1963-2013

Annualized returns, 1963-2013

Don’t Fight the Tape, Unless...

Momentum investing works on its own—but there are ways to improve the strategy by following some trends and ignoring others. If you are trading momentum stocks, remember that the momentum effect has worked better amongst the cheapest and the highest quality names out there.  If value was a part of your momentum strategy, you’d wouldn’t have owned any of the stocks making headlines for the wrong reasons so far in 2014.

Some people are buying the dip, but most of these stocks remain very expensive. Investing based on factors like momentum is like all other investing: diversification improves and smoothens your returns.

 

[i] Value based on a combined measure of p/sales, p/earnings, ebitda/ev, yield

[ii] Earnings Quality defined as percentage change in total accruals  

The Five Year Market Metamorphosis

The U.S. market has gotten much more expensive in the past five years following the incredible buying opportunity in 2009.  One great valuation measure is EBITDA (earnings before interest, depreciation, and amortization) divided by Enterprise Value (sometimes called ‘takeover value’, calculated as market value of a company, plus debt, minus cash). I’ll shorten the name and call it ‘EBITDA yield,’ a higher yield means the market is cheaper.

Using this measure to look at all investable stocks in the U.S.[i], it’s clear that the market as a whole has gotten more expensive since 2009. The EBITDA yield at the end of February, 2009 was roughly 14% for the entire U.S. market—today it is 9%.  But the market's overall valuation only tells part of the story. The market in 2009 offered a wide variety of valuations, whereas today, in 2014, the opportunities are much more clustered. Stocks today are more expensive, but valuations are also much more homogeneous. Here is a look at U.S. stocks[ii] and how their valuations were dispersed in 2009 and 2014, compared to their very long term average.

This change is being driven by a convergence of valuations. In 2009 cheap stocks were very cheap; now, they are less so (blue line below). The EBITDA yield for the cheapest stocks (10th percentile) has come down dramatically, from 35% in 2009 to 17% today. In contrast, expensive stocks (90th percentile) are about as expensive today as they were in 2009 (red line below).  The market median (green line below) has also gotten more expensive--mainly because the cheaper stocks have done so well. This is driving the clustered valuations we are seeing today. Fewer big bargains have led to a more uniform market.

This doesn’t suggest that you should abandon valuation as a key component in stock selection (quite the contrary), but it does suggest there is less of an edge today in cheap stocks than there was five years ago: there are far fewer U.S. stocks that are very cheap.  International markets offer more diverse valuations (see Meb Faber’s CAPE calculations for countries), but that is a topic for a different post.

 

[i] Market Cap> $200MM

[ii] Stocks with market caps>$200MM inflation adjusted

Warren Buffett and the Banana Man

Had a Chiquita banana lately? I was amazed to learn the remarkable story behind the brand, which began in 1911 with a company called Cuyamel Fruit Company and a Russian immigrant named Sam Zemurray. Sam (aka “Sam the banana man”) was a remarkable businessman who personified the American dream, but also exposed some of the ugliness of American business in the early part of the 20th century. While he had his fair share of faults, reading about his many positive qualities and remarkable successes constantly reminded me of Warren Buffett. Their early successes, mid-career transformations, and attitudes towards business were remarkably similar. Both took over mismanaged companies and turned them into behemoths of business. This quote, said of one of the two men, could have been said of either: “He’s a risk taker…he’s a thinker, and he’s a doer.”[i]

Here I highlight some of these similarities between the two men. I only scratch the surface of Sam Zemurray’s remarkable tale. For the whole story, I suggest you read The Fish that Ate the Whale: the Life and Times of America’s Banana King by Rich Cohen, from which I take most of the information and all the quotes for this story.

“Ripes” and “Cigarette Butts”

Early in his investing career, Buffett was famous for a style of value investing learned from Ben Graham. Through in-depth research he would find forgotten or discarded companies, trading at deep discounts to the value of their net assets, from which he could extract a little bit of value.  These stocks were often terrible companies, but were trading below liquidation value. Buffett called them “cigarette butts,” because like discarded butts—from which one could enjoy one last puff—they offered one last bit of value, and Buffett was a master at extracting that value.

Sam Zemurray’s early success was owed to the exact same strategy. He moved to America from Russia at age 14 and did anything to make a buck. He discovered a clever strategy with the exotic banana fruit (which few Americans had tasted prior to 1900). The big fruit companies (the precursors to Chiquita and Dole) would import bananas from the equatorial tropics and move them to markets throughout the U.S. for sale. But some of the bananas would reach the U.S. already ripe, and would be discarded by the big companies because they’d rot before making it to market. As much as 15% of the bananas imported were ripes.

Zemurray realized that these discarded ripes—like Buffett’s cigarette butts—were far from worthless. It required hard work and coordination, but he could make a killing off of ripes. One man’s trash was Zemurray’s gold. He’d take the discarded ripes, quickly load them on a train, and sell them right out of the traincar as it moved from town to town—earning 100% profit.  

Zemurray went into a Western Union office and spoke to a telegraph operator. Having no money, Sam offered a deal: if the man radioed every operator ahead, asking each of them to spread the word to local merchants—dirt-cheap bananas coming through for merchants and peddlers—Sam would share a percentage of his sales. When the Illinois Central arrived in the next town, the customers were waiting. Zemurray talked terms through the boxcar door, a tower of ripes at his back. Ten for eight. Thirteen for ten. He broke off a bunch, put the money in his pocket… In 1903, he sold 574,000. Within a decade, he would be selling more than a million bananas a year.

The banana man’s strategy was brilliant.  He was selling hundreds of thousands of bananas each year without the normal costs:

His fruit was grown for him, harvested, and shipped for free. He was like a bike racer riding in the windbreak of a semitruck—the semitruck being United Fruit. By his twenty-first birthday, he had a hundred thousand dollars in the bank. In today’s terms, he would have been a millionaire. If he had stopped there, his would have been a great success story.

But while the ripes and “cigarette butt” strategies worked well on a small scale for a while, Sam Zemurray and Buffett wanted more—they had to adopt new strategies that worked on a larger scale.

Stage Two

Zemurray founded the Cuyamel Fruit Company in 1911 as a more traditional fruit company: growing, harvesting and distributing bananas. He bought land in Honduras and arranged sweet-heart deals with the local government.  Kickbacks and bribes were necessary to keep costs down and profits flowing.  Honduras, under Zemurray, was a true “banana republic." He built an empire there, ousting government leaders when they wouldn’t cater to his needs (read the book for more great details):

“Deposing [José Santos] Zelaya’s government in Nicaragua [in 1909] had required the combined efforts of the [American] State Department, the navy, the marines, and President Taft,” wrote Stephen Kinzer in Overthrow. “In Honduras, Zemurray … [did] the job himself.

Stage two for Buffett, of course, was moving on to great companies bought at reasonable prices.  As he is famous for saying, “it is far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.” After clever beginnings, both men thrived by owning great, efficient businesses.  Buffett started with unknown downtrodden companies, but made his fortune in brand names like Coca-Cola and American Express. Zemurray started with a similar arbitrage strategy, but made his millions by building a great company.

Know Your Business and Empower Your People

In building Cuyamel from the ground up, Zemurray’s success came from getting into the weeds (or, more literally, the jungle). He spent his time on location in Honduras streamlining operations and building the world’s most efficient banana company. He worked 16 hour days and knew every aspect of the business. Buffett’s edge was similar. He was willing to put in the time reading Moody’s manuals cover to cover when no one else bothered. It takes discipline, time, and lots of energy to know a business inside and out, but the results are worth it.

Zemurray sold Cuyamel to the giant United Fruit company for $31.4 million of United Fruit stock in 1930, right at the outset of the Great Depression. Seen in the figure below, Zemurray sold his Cuyamel right at the peak, but United Fruit collapsed due to the economic hardships of the Great Depression and terrible mismanagement. Zemurray came out of a brief retirement frustrated by the inept leadership at United. The United executives were trying to manage operations in the tropics from their offices in Boston, and their micromanaging was killing the company. Zemurray knew this was a terrible strategy:

“This man in Guatemala, he’s your manager, isn’t he?” Zemurray asked [at a board meeting]. Yes. “Then listen to what the man is telling you. You’re here, he’s there,” said Zemurray. “If you trust him, trust him. If you don’t trust him, fire him and get a man you do trust in the job.”

Buffett, too, believes in trusting his different managers to make the right decisions and does not meddle. Empowering others leads to phenomenal results.

Behind the scenes, Zemurray gathered support from other shareholders of United Fruit and collected enough proxy votes to essentially take control of the company. He went to another board meeting and laid out his plan for improving the company, but didn’t reveal his ace in the hole. The chairman of United Fruit dismissed Sam's plan and chose instead to make fun of his Russian accent, saying “unfortunately, Mr. Zemurray, I can’t understand a word of what you say.”  Sam stormed out, making the board members think they’d humiliated him, but he was just gathering the proxy slips he had stored outside. He returned and slammed the proxies on the table and said, “You’re fired! Can you understand that, Mr. Chairman? You gentlemen have been fucking up this business long enough!”

This incredible coup earning him the nickname “the fish that swallowed the whale.” He took over the company and remade it in the image of Cuyamel Fruit. From the time he took over in 1933 until his full retirement in 1954, United Fruit stock grew by 2,300%[ii]--640% more than the S&P 500 over the same time period.

When Zemurray took over United Fruit, he decentralized the company.  He recognized that a chairman sitting in Boston should not be making decisions about how best to manage acres of banana plants in Honduras. Under Sam’s leadership, decision making power was pushed back to United Fruit employees in the tropics managing the fields. Both Sam and Buffett trusted managers to run their business without meddling.

Key Lessons

I’ve ignored the more dubious parts of Zemurray’s character and business, including bad labor conditions in the tropics and coordination with the CIA to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz, the Guatemalan president who wouldn’t cater to Zemurray’s needs. His complete story is remarkable and I highly suggest buying and enjoying the book; it is a great case study of a successful business. United Fruit eventually became Chiquita, but the early history—beginning with Zemurray and Cuyamel—is the most fascinating. Who knew a simple fruit could have such an incredible story.

Sam and Buffett’s stories offer many great lessons for business and investing, I’ll end with these three:

1.     Start with small advantages. Look for corners of the market that have been forgotten or are too insignificant for the big players (individual investors, for example, can do well in micro-cap stocks like the ones with which Buffett began his investing career.  Big entities can’t bother with these small companies, but small investors can).

2.    Know your business from end to end. It’s amazing what an edge you can have by doing your homework. Both Sam and Buffett knew all aspects of their businesses and made better decisions as a result.

3.    Trust your lieutenants to manage themselves, don’t micromanage. Empower managers. Once at the top of their companies, Zemurray and Buffett delegated and trusted their men on the ground.

 

[i] Andrew Preston, of the United Fruit Co., describing Sam Zemurray.

[ii] Using CRSP return data for United Fruit.